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Abstract—Once critical substations are compromised, attack
agents can coordinate among their peers to plot for maximizing
disruption using local control devices. For defenders, it is critical
to enumerate and identify all digital relays to determine the
systemic risks. Any combination of disruptive switching via the
compromised relays can result in misoperation or immediate
effect to the system. The resulting consequence of these attack’s
initial events would possibly incur cascading failure to a grid.
This paper quantifies the criticality of substation protective relays
with the combination of the outage level and its corresponding
severity risk index. The proposed hypothesized outages are
based on the type of protective relaying, bus configuration of a
substation, and commonly implemented relaying schemes, such as
bus differential, directional overcurrent and distance relays, are
studied. This preliminary work also provides three approaches
of determination in probabilities for sensitivity analysis. The
proposed risk indices are evaluated using IEEE test systems.
Index Terms—Combinatorics, cyber-physical system, digital
relays, power substation, risk assessment, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE implementation of remote access to substations forsystem management has introduced residual risks with
electronic intrusion possibilities [1]. In the recent cyber inci-
dents in Ukraine, evidences have shown that the manipulation
of electronic devices via remote-connected intrusion to the
critical cyber assets has enabled attackers to plot for massive
outages [2]. The attacks obviously were plausible because of
the vulnerabilities allowing remote control capability through
existing information and communications technologies that
enable possible intrusion paths for attackers to access the
network [3]. Upon successful intrusion through a remote
access point, the attackers can disrupt the communication
channel, supervise the system status, monitor critical data, and
covertly operate the local control system [4].
To secure the substation automation network, the latest
security standards released by North American Electric Reli-
ability Corporation (NERC)’s critical infrastructure protection
(CIP) requires power company, utility, vendors, and other
suppliers to regularly perform risk analysis on the critical
assets in order to improve the system security [5], [6]. As
the power communication infrastructure has now evolved to
a more highly interconnected network, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework provides a
guideline to systematically assess the risks, vulnerabilities, and
securities of the smart grid technologies [7]. Additionally, the
IEEE Standard 1686 [8] is published to further emphasize the
functions and features provided by the intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) should be incorporated in CIP program that
can enhance the security level of these critical cyber assets.
The fundamental question remains – what if a substation
is compromised? What can happen to the entire power grid
if attackers successfully execute their plan? There have been
technical discussions about hypothetical impact scenarios by
enumerating the combinations of potential catastrophe through
unauthorized remote connection [9]. This includes the prelim-
inary investigation on the specific protective relaying scheme,
bus differential configuration, and what would be the impact
if the IED is compromised [10], [11]. There still remains a
challenge about how to effectively enumerate all hypothesized
scenarios of cyber-induced attacks that can help defenders
to identify pivotal combinations [9]–[12]. The widely im-
plemented tool for steady-state approach [13] has been an
effective pre-screening methodology to identify problematic
scenarios that can be initiated with electronic manipulation.
The proof-of-concept of active command mediation defense
(A*CMD) has been implemented to thwart intrusion [14].
II. RISK MODELING OF RELAY OUTAGES
The combinations of the substation criticality have been
investigated in the recent years on “bottleneck list” in [9]
and [10], which essentially assess the risk level for each
substation outage by identifying the cases that are critically-
weakened conditions based on presumed attack scenarios.
With the consistent representation of terminology in the def-
inition of “critical” cases, the section extends the modeling
of relay outages that can be risky to manipulated that may
initiate system-wide instability. Fig. 1 depicts the details of
the connectivity relationship between the protective IEDs
and their corresponding electrically controlling components
in the substation i. Suppose that the substation i has been
compromised, the attackers would be able to manipulate single
or multiple protective relays. Different relay would generate
different outage when it has been compromised. As depicted in
Fig. 1, if the directional distance relay has been compromised,
attackers can manipulate a disruptive switching command to
electrically disconnect substation i + 1, thus other relays may
misoperate causing the transmission line (i, i + 1) to be de-
energized. Similarly, the implications may occur on other
relays within a substation or other regional substations so as
the resulting impacts to the power grid operation.
To quantify this problem, we introduce the variable Ci,k
to denote the set of the electrical components, including
all the lines, transformers, generator units, and loads, which
are electronically controlled by the protective IED k, at the
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of protective IEDs and the control perimeters within a substation
substation i. To enumerate all the possible successful cyber
intrusions in the substation i, it generates∑k∈K 2
∣Ci,k ∣ different
consequences, K is the total number of the IEDs in the
substation i. In our formulation, we’ll assume the attacker
would maximize the impacts by disconnecting as many elec-
trical components as possible. Under this assumption, C′i,k is
the most “severe” set that is understudied in the proposed
formulation, where C′i,k ⊂ Ci,k.
Extended from the previous studies on the hypothetical sub-
station outages, which reveal that the cyber-based contingency
analysis is an enumerative study by extensively evaluating all
the possible combinations of substations. The assessment of
the digital protective relays is a much more complex problem,
which includes a larger number of combinations:
S = ( ∑
k∈K1
2
∣C1,k ∣) ⋅ ( ∑
k∈K2
2
∣C2,k ∣)⋯( ∑
k∈KS
2
∣CS,k ∣)
=∏
i∈S
( ∑
k∈Ki
2
∣Ci,k ∣)
(1)
where S is the total number of the substations in the system
and Ki is the total number of the IEDs in the substation i.
The constant 2 indicates the open or closed status for each
scenario of associated IEDs and substations, which implies
2∣Ci,k ∣ scenarios if IED k is compromised. In our formulation,
the most “severe” set C′i,k is considered for each IED k, which
would create Ki different scenarios in total within single
substation i. Thus, the Eq. 1 can be modified as:
S = 2K1 ⋅ 2K2⋯2KS =∏
i∈S
2
Ki = 2∑Ki (2)
where 2Ki represents the total number of outages of IEDs
in substaion i. It is observed that S is determined by the
configurations of IEDs in each substation or the total number
IEDs in the system.
The right side of the Eq. 2 is the sum of the S-select-k
formulation, which is expressed as the designated outages of
two or more components/substations and would produce dif-
ferent outcomes with or without considering outages of IEDs.
For instance, the S-select-3 problem on the substation outages
would enumerate C30
3
= 4,060 cases in IEEE 30-bus system.
However, from the Table I, it is observed that there are 106
IEDs are evaluated, which would generate 192,920 scenarios
consequently. It’s predictable that the number of combinations
would be greatly increased when studying larger cases. In this
paper, we emphasize on detailing such hypothesized outages
to the device level (the digital relays) to determine the relay
outages. Different relay types may result in a consequentially
different effect on the system than the attack on distance
relays.
TABLE I: Results of standard deviation of IEEE test systems
Test systems σ ≤ 1% 1% < σ ≤ 5% 5% < σ ≤ 10% Total #.
IEEE 30-bus 1 49 34 106
IEEE 39-bus 4 61 47 131
IEEE 57-bus 7 74 71 245
IEEE 118-bus 24 238 121 439
IEEE 300-bus 43 411 354 959
III. CYBER-INDUCED IMPACT ASSESSMENT
A. Probabilities and combinations
A standard evaluation model for quantifying the risk of the
disturbances or the outages is represented by the product of
the event probability and its severity [15]:
Ri,k = Pri,k ⋅Sri,k (3)
3where Ri,k is the risk index of the protective IED k at
substation i, Pri,k denotes the probability of event when
the cyber intruder successfully hacks in the substation i and
manipulate the protective IED k, consequently, Sri,k is the
severity of the outages, which, in this paper, is represented
using the most “severe” set C′i,k . To simulate probability of the
intruding attempts, this paper assigns the probabilities based
on the size of the set C′i,k. The Eq. 3 is elaborated as follows:
Ri,k =
⎧⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∣C′i,k ∣
∑k∈K ∣C
′
i,k
∣
⋅
∑i∈S ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
, If diverged
∣C′i,k ∣
∑k∈K ∣C
′
i,k
∣
⋅
∣Pi,k ∣
∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣
, Otherwise
(4)
where Pri,k = ∣C′i,k ∣/∑k∈K ∣C
′
i,k ∣ is the probability of the
successful intruding attempts towards the protective relay k
in the substation i. In the study, it is assumed that an attacker
does not acquire the knowledge of the power system and does
not have a complete information of the entire power grid. They
would enumerate all trials based on the connectivity degrees of
the relays that connect more electrical components. These can
be represented by C′i,k. The probability is then calculated by
measuring the proportion of the size of the “severe” set ∣C′i,k ∣
to the sum of the “severe” sets for all the protective relays.
In the Eq. 4, the variable Pi,k denotes the total injected
power to the substation node i, which are electronically
controlled by the relay k. When the intruder successfully
compromises the control panel and has the access to the IED
k, all the power that is connected to this IED is considered
as potential risks. To quantify the outage severity, the power
flow evaluation is applied to verify the solutions of the study
in which the outcome can be either converged or diverged. For
this reason, two different indices are proposed.
In the first scenario, if a solution agrees with a converged re-
sult, the severity of the outage Sri,k is determined by calculat-
ing the quotient by dividing the injected power that connected
to the protective IED k using the total injected power to the
substation i, which is represented as ∣Pi,k ∣/∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣. The
quotient locates the threshold [0,1]. If the solution is diverged,
which suggests that the system can be unstable. Under this
scenario, the severity of such event is considered to be much
more severe where a potential system-wide blackout would
occur. Sri,k = ∑i∈S ∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣/∑k∈K ∣Pi,k ∣ is quantified as
the severity of the outage. Note that the numerator is the total
power injection for the system. The proposed metric assures
a comparable larger index than the previous conditions.
B. Sensitivity analysis using standard deviation
To evaluate the performance of the proposed metric, the
assigned probability Pri,k captures successful intrusion of
a given cyber network using pseudo-random numbers. The
results of the equal distribution of the probability are given
in this problem, in order to initiate a comparison study. The
pseudo-random number is calculated through:
Pi,k =
P
′
i,k
∑k∈K rand(1,K)
(5)
where rand(1,K) represents the function that generates an
array of random numbers within the interval (0,1), which has
length of K . P′i,k is the k-th elements in the array. The sum
of these random number P′i,k will not necessarily give a 1.0,
which is not acceptable in probability distribution function.
The scaling process is given by dividing each random number
with the sum of all the random numbers, thus, the modified
variable Pi,k is the k-th scaled random number which can be
used as the probability assigned to the outage of the relay k
in the substation i.
Accordingly, the standard deviation σ is given as the index
to assess the performance of the proposed metric.
3σ2i,k = (R
C
i,k −R
A
i,k)
2
+ (RRi,k −R
A
i,k)
2
+ (REi,k −R
A
i,k)
2
(6)
where RCi,k denotes the risk of protective IED k in the
substation i using the probability which are derived from
the connectivity set C′i,k. Similarly, R
R
i,k and R
E
i,k are the
risk indices using probabilities of pseudo random value and
equal distribution method, correspondingly.RAi,k is the average
risk index. σi,k is the standard deviation of protective IED k
which is in substation i. Fig. 2 describes the algorithm of the
enumerative assessment for the protective relays. The proposed
algorithm includes two loops, which include the iteration of
power substations and the protective IEDs in each substation.
IV. SIMULATION STUDY
A. Results of hypothesized relay outages
This study is validated using IEEE test systems. IEEE
30-bus system contains 6 generation units and 20 loads,
which generate 191.6 MW power to the system and consume
189.2 MW power respectively. IEEE 39-bus system contains
9 generation nodes and 21 loads are connected to the system.
12 power transformers are connected to the system. It is
observed that 6297.9 MW power is injected into the system
and 6254.2 MW power is dispatched to the loads. IEEE 57-
bus system is installed with 17 transformers and 7 generation
units, which supply 1278.7 MW to the grid. The fixed 42 loads
consume 1250.8 MW power in total. IEEE 118-bus system
contains 54 generation units, 99 fixed loads, and 9 power
transformers. The total power injection to the grid is 4374.9
MW and the total load consumption is 4242 MW power.
69 generators are installed in the IEEE 300-bus system with
23935.4 MW power supply and 201 loads totally consume
23525.8 MW of power. For each IEEE test case, it is initialized
with five default protective relays in each substation, which are
directional overcurrent relay, bus differential relay, directional
distance relay, under frequency relay, and transformer relay.
For different bus type and configuration, the set of protective
relays will diversify. It is noticed that the in the Eq. 4, the
diverged solution would give a comparably higher value than
the converged solution, in this section, in order to explicitly
identify the “worst” cases, all the risk indices of diverged
solutions are modified to 1.0.
Figs. 3–7 display the results of propsed risk index for
different relays in IEEE 30-, 39-, 57-, 118-, and 300-bus
systems, respectively. From these figures, the negative markers
represent “not available” for such relay. For example, it is
assumed in this study that the under frequency relays are
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Fig. 2: Algorithmic enumeration of relay outages
Fig. 3: Risk index results of IEEE 30-bus system
equipped with the substations with generators. For those
substations which are not classified as generation bus or load
bus, the transformer relays are not equipped. In this respect,
the negative risk value is given to differentiate the relay
configurations between each substations. In the Fig. 3, the bus
11 is not modeled with any relay as the solutions of steady-
state analysis reveal that the power flows from/to the bus 11
is 0 MW, which, based on the definition in the Eq. 4, would
assign 0 as the risk index for each relay. However, the potential
Fig. 4: Risk index results of IEEE 39-bus system
Fig. 5: Risk index results of IEEE 57-bus system
risks of relay outages in this substation may still exist. The
cascading studies and transient analysis can be included to
improve the existing model for future enhancement.
From the figures, it is observed that risk index for most
relays are within [0.35, 0.50]. The critical IEDs are marked out
with risk index of 1.0. For example, in IEEE 30-bus system,
the overcurrent relay in the substation 9, bus differential
and distance relays in the substation 12, 25, and 27, are
identified as “worst” relays which would cause the system-
wide instability in the steady-state analysis. In IEEE 39-bus
system, it is observed that 18 out of 195 relays are identified as
the critical relays, 11 out of which are bus differential relay. In
IEEE 57-bus system, it can be observed that 9 out of 285 relays
are evaluated as critical relays with 1.0 risk index, 5 of them
are bus differential relays and 4 of them are distance relays. In
IEEE 118-bus system, 16 out 590 relays are found to be critical
and half of them are bus differential relays. Similarly, in the
IEEE 300-bus system, 125 relays are identified as critical. 28%
of the relays are directional distance relays, 59% of them are
bus differential relays.
Generally, the distance relays in large-sized system are
ranked as critical outage whereas the impacts of a relatively
smaller system may not have similar impacts. For example,
substation 186 is connected with a load demand of -21 MW,
which would provide 21 MW to the grid. Once the distance
relay has been compromised, the outgoing lines of the substa-
tion would be disconnected, in which case, all the branches
(93-186, 185-186) adjacent to that bus would be consequently
disconnected. Thus, the substation 186 is islanded and the
unbalance between the generation and load demand cannot
5Fig. 6: Risk index results of IEEE 118-bus system
Fig. 7: Risk index results of IEEE 300-bus system
be absorbed in the steady-state power flow analysis. From the
observation of this simulation study, the larger cases with a
larger lumped load per location (substation) can also result in
a higher risk level of distance relays.
By integrating the results found risk index evaluations,
it is concluded that the bus differential relay acquires the
highest risk index compared with other relays because 1)
bus differential relay is the most commonly deployed relay
in the substation and 2) it would electrically disconnect all
the switches from the system if it has been compromised,
which would change the system configuration and remove the
substation from the initial setup in the test system. To improve
the risk metric of the bus differential relays, the potential
cascading failure is needed to be further studied. Additionally,
the impacts of directional distance relay are higher than the
directional overcurrent relay due to the physical relations and
relays where the disconnects affect abrupt change of the oper-
ating states. Compared with distance relay, overcurrent relay
is assumed installed on the incoming lines from generators
and local loads. When it has been compromised, the power
injections and load demand would largely be disconnected
from the system. However, the compromised distance relay
would change the topology of the initial grid and consequently,
cause substation islanded from the system, which is unstable
in the study of steady-state evaluation.
B. Sensitivity analysis of proposed metric
In order to compare the performance using different proba-
bility distribution, the Eq. 6 introduces the standard deviation
to evaluate the sensitivity of the proposed metric. Table I
Fig. 8: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 30-bus test system
Fig. 9: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 39-bus test system
Fig. 10: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 57-bus test system
Fig. 11: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 118-bus test system
in section II summarizes the detailed results of standard
deviations for each IEEE test cases. The σ is denoted by
the standard deviation and the middle three columns record
the number of relays whose σ are in the thresholds of (0,
0.01], (0.01, 0.05], and (0.05, 0.1], respectively. Each substa-
tion might have different protective IED configuration. When
starting the standard deviation evaluation, the relays that are
recorded in negative risk index in the previous sections should
be eliminated. For example, in the IEEE 30-bus system, under
frequency relay is not available in the substation 3 but is
equipped in the substation 2.
Figs. 8–12 show the standard deviations for different relays
using different probability distributions in the IEEE test sys-
tems. Generally, it is recorded that 79%, 85%, 62%, 87%, and
84% of relays acquire the standard deviation within 0.1 for
IEEE 30-, 39-, 57-, 118-, 300-bus system, respectively.
As summarized in Table I, it is observed that the σ of
80% of relays are located in the interval (0, 0.1], which
6Fig. 12: Standard deviation σ for IEEE 300-bus test system
Fig. 13: Statistical summary of the protective relays distribution
according to standard deviation interval
equals to the variance in the interval (0, 0.01]. Additionally,
it is realized that the σ for most scenarios are located in the
section 3% ≤ σ ≤ 8%, which is the middle part of the in the
interval (0, 0.1]. To specify the distribution, Fig. 13 details
the numerical results the relay distributions according to the
standard deviation interval, notice that each big interval would
represent 0.025 incremental of the standard deviation as the
x-axis variable. The portion of the relays in the corresponding
standard deviation interval is given as the y-axis variable. For
example, combining these five test systems, approximate 25
% of relays would locate in the first interval σ ≤ 2.5% and
30% of relays are found in the interval 2.5% ≤ σ ≤ 5%.
According to the distribution sample points in the fig. 13, it is
statistically observed that such distribution can be fitted using
a Normal distribution or Poisson distribution with the mean
approximately equals to 8 units, which suggests that σ equals
to 0.04. The fitting function would be determined to calculate
the confidence interval for the standard deviation. Additionally,
it is revealed that the σ of critical relays are much less than
other relays. Because the Eq. 4 suggests that the higher the
severity of the event, the lesser the risk index would be that
is affected by the probability distribution. In this respect, the
critical protective relays recorded in the risk index figures can
be considered as reliable in the sense of steady-state analysis.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposed framework further extends our worst-case
assumptions of substation outage to the detailed level of
abstraction at a device level, which is coupled to critical cyber
assets within a substation. The analysis of impact level for
hypothetical scenarios of substation protective relay outages
is verified using the proposed metric. The metric quantifies
the cyber-physical systemic risks of electronic intrusion. The
combinatorial enumeration provides an extended exploration
of potential attack strategies that is associated with different
part of substation automation framework that is connected to
electrical switchgear in physical facilities. To evaluate the per-
formance of the risk-based analysis and improve the reliability
of the index, we applied a comparison study by providing
several probability distribution functions and investigate the
standard deviation of the proposed model. The results of risk-
based analysis have been validated using IEEE test systems
by systematically enumerating hypothesized relay outages
that may cause widespread instability. Future studies include
improvements of multiple relay types in the enumeration
and sequential permutation enumeration. This can also be
incorporated as part of the substation outage enumeration
and optimization that would effectively identify the critical
scenarios that can help asset owners for planning purpose.
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